Summary
Philosophy of Physics has emerged recently as a scholarly important sub-field of philosophy of science. However outside the small community of experts it is not a wellknown field. It is not clear even to experts the exact nature of the field: how much philosophical is it? What is its relation to physics? In this work it is presented an overview of philosophy of physics that tries to answer these and other questions.
Introduction
This work will try to provide an account of philosophy of physics that is accessible to a wide audience besides actual practitioners of philosophy of physics. For this purpose philosophy of physics will be considered from different perspectives, so that it is possible to present different aspects of the field. The work is structured in a way that is informative both to the expert as to experts in related areas, and also to the educated non-specialist. Some examples of the 'state-of-the-art' in this field will be presented; however the main motif of the work will be to provide a broad account of philosophy of physics by taking into account its relation to: (1) physics; (2) physics education; (3) history of physics; (4) other sub-fields of philosophy of science, like philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of cognitive sciences, and philosophy of biology, (5) philosophy of science; (6) philosophy in general. Doing this will enable me to provide a positive characterization of: (1) what is unique to philosophy of physics; (2) in practical terms, what is it good for; (3) where are we today regarding this field; (4) what might be relevant features to take into account for the future development of the field.
In order to accommodate these different objectives in the work, Section 2.1 starts with a brief presentation of the historical development of philosophy of physics from within philosophy of science. Then, in Section 2.2, it is given a first account of philosophy of physics today. In Section 2.3 an example of an area/sub-field of philosophy of physics will be considered: philosophy of quantum field theory. In Section 3 it is considered the relation of philosophy of physics and physics. In Section 3.1 it is addressed the question about to what point is philosophy of physics autonomous with respect to physics. In Section 3.2 it is presented the idea that in part philosophy of physics can be seen as a continuation of physics by other means. Finally in Section 3.3 it is addressed the possible relevance of philosophy of physics in physics education. Section 4 is devoted to the relation of philosophy of physics and history of physics. Here it will be defended the importance of historically oriented works in philosophy of physics. In Section 5 it is given an account of the contemporary relation of philosophy of physics and philosophy. In Section 5.1 it is considered the current relation of philosophy of physics and philosophy of science. This will make possible a characterization of philosophy of physics revealing its specificity, i.e. what makes it unique. In Section 5.2 it is considered the importance of taking into account other sub-fields of philosophy of science for the development of philosophy of physics, in this way broadening the philosophical scope beyond what has become traditional in philosophy of physics. Then in Section 5.3 the philosophical horizon will be open even more by calling the attention to the importance of metaphysical presuppositions in physics, and the possible importance of alternative philosophical inputs, that go beyond the philosophical traditional in which philosophy of physics develops.
Philosophy of Physics as an Autonomous Discipline
Nowadays it is normal to find philosophers of physics in philosophy of science departments; also there are journals almost exclusively dedicated to philosophy of physics, and it is quite common to find highly specialized works on philosophy of physics in journals of philosophy of science. There is in fact an academic community of philosophers of physics, i.e. we face the fact that there is an academic discipline named philosophy of physics. It is possible to offer a sociological characterization of this discipline. However, here one is more interested in coming to terms with philosophy of physics in its own terms, i.e. by understanding the differentiating aspects of the discipline, its 'identity'. In order to do so Section 2.1 will start by considering the historical differentiation of philosophy of physics from philosophy of science. It will be shown that what we call today philosophy of physics was already part of philosophy of The development and differentiation of the modern disciplines of theoretical physics and experimental physics (see, e.g., Jungnickel and McCormmach 1986) , was accompanied by more specific philosophical works. We find a clear example of this, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in the work of Henry Poincaré. Considering just one of his books, La Science et l' Hypothèse (1902) , we find very specialized work that is a current trend of the 'self-identity' of philosophy of physics and other sub-fields of philosophy of science, like philosophy of cognitive sciences and philosophy of mathematics. For example Poincaré develops the view that the axioms of geometry are conventions. Nowadays one could put this line of ideas as a subject of philosophy of mathematics. Another interesting view is Poincaré's distinguish between a representative space and the mathematical geometric space. The first one is prior to a conceptual notion of space (and because of this prior to the geometric space) it is 'built' from our visual, tactile, and in particular motor 'sensations'. It is our bodily motion in correlation to solid bodies that enables the development of the notion of space. Poincaré (possibly, following Hermann von Helmholtz; see, e.g. Torretti 1984; Darrigol 2008 ) is making an anticipation of (similar) views later put forward by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his Phénoménologie de la Perception (1945) , like the idea of a lived space that is previous to the objective space (i.e. mathematical space), and the importance of the body-scheme to perception. This is a current research topic in cognitive sciences, which is motive of considerable debate in philosophy of cognitive sciences (see, .e.g., Noë 2004) . Regarding philosophy of physics we find several examples of it in Poincaré's book: a conceptual analysis of the concept of force in classical mechanics, and of the principle of conservation of energy; or a critical analysis of Lorentz's electron theory.
Another example, that if published today would be regarded as a book of philosophy of physics, is Hans Reichenbach's The philosophy of space and time (1928) . Already the name is truly contemporary. In what regards the content, we find a treatment of the concepts of space and time based in the theory of relativity and in Einstein's theory of gravity, i.e. a detailed conceptual treatment of the concepts of space and time made by 1934) , and in terms of his later propensity interpretation. We see in this work a clear example of another concentration area of contemporary philosophy of physics centered in quantum mechanics.
• In Virtual Processes and Virtual Particles: Real or Fictitious? (1970) Mario Bunge addresses the question of the status of the so-called virtual quanta that arises in the quantum field theory description of physical processes, like for example the electronelectron scattering (the quantum 'equivalent' of a collision between billiard balls). According to Bunge, virtual quanta are conceptually irrelevant (fictions), since they are associated with terms of a perturbative expansion. At best they should be seen as a computational intermediary. This work is a clear example of what we call today philosophy of quantum field theory, another sub-field (concentration area) of philosophy of physics.
• In Leçons sur la genèse des théories physiques (1974) , Jacques Merleau-Ponty provides an analysis of contributions by Galileo, Ampère and Einstein, centered in the distinction between three elements of physical theories: conceptual, mathematical, and experimental. The difference between the conceptual and mathematical elements are particularly clear in Galileo that had a new conceptual scheme to address the motion of bodies but had to resort to imperfect mathematics to implement it (in particular Galileo lacks a mathematical notion of instantaneous velocity).
All these examples show that what we regard today as philosophy of physics was being done for quite some time under the label of philosophy of science; and that we must regard philosophy of physics as emerging from philosophy of science.
Philosophy of Physics on Its Own
Since there was philosophy of physics inside philosophy of science it seems difficult to define it in its own terms by an intrinsic characterization that provides a differentiating motif. In the end we know that there are social factors involved, and the question is if it is possible to avoid them when coming to terms with philosophy of physics as an autonomous discipline. As a sub-field of philosophy of science it simply emerged from it due to the coming-to-be of a specialized community that promoted a self-identity as philosophers of physics, when in the end the new discipline seems to be already very old. In its definition as a discipline we assist at a consolidation of topics that were already present, and, which in part, have already been mentioned in this review: a specialization, following a very technical approach, in physical theories or fields, like e.g. quantum mechanics; a concentration in conceptual foundational issues, e.g. related to the theory of relativity; a very focused treatment of more philosophical aspects, like e.g. the ontology of space and time. In their affirmation as an autonomous group it is particularly important the relation of the self-defined philosophers of physics with the, by now separated, philosophy of science and with physics. These are issues that will be addressed below. It will be defended the view that it is possible to give an 'intrinsic' nonsociological characterization of philosophy of physics by considering these relations. For the moment let us consider in more detail an example of contemporary philosophy of physics.
One Example: Philosophy of Quantum Field Theory
As philosophy of physics emerged as an autonomous discipline in relation both to physics and philosophy of science an important aspect of its consolidation was the specialization on particular issues. One example already felt with strength in the seventies of last century was the philosophy of space and time (see, e.g., Earman 1970; Fine 1973; Friedman 1973; Sklar 1974; Glymour 1977; Malament 1977) . Regarding quantum field theory we can consider it birth decade to be the eighties. The works of Michael Redhead and Paul Teller were particularly important in putting forward a consistent and more systematic philosophical approach to quantum field theory (see, e.g., Redhead 1983 Redhead , 1988 Teller 1990a Teller , 1990b Teller , 1995 . When looking into these works one is already facing a possible identity problem of philosophy of physics. What is there in these works that makes them philosophical? What differentiates them from works in foundations of physics made by physicists? For example in A philosopher looks at quantum field theory (1988) Michael Redhead presents a list of eight questions that he considers to be of a more or less metaphysical character. Examples of these semimetaphysical questions are: Q. 3. What is the nature of the vacuum in quantum field theory; Q. 4. What is the status of so-called virtual particles? (This is the issue addressed in the above mentioned work by Bunge).
Only in a very 'decaff' metaphysics can these questions be considered metaphysical at all. These are typical foundational problems addressed by the (usually) antimetaphysical theoretical physicists. Looking now at Paul Teller's work one is again confronted by the difficulty of grabbing the philosophical content of his approach. In his An interpretive introduction to quantum field theory (1995) Teller tries to provide an interpretation of quantum field theory. This comes out to be a proposal for substituting an idea of particles as hard material 'real' stuff (substances) by associating to quantum fields the idea of a propensity for detecting a number of quanta (particles) of a particular type. Again it is difficult to make precise what is the distinctive philosophical aspect of this work. The view defended here is that this possible identity problem is not a feature of the early days of philosophy of quantum field theory (or even of philosophy of In reality there is no hard-and-fast way to address the possible identity problem of philosophy of physics in general and philosophy of quantum field theory in particular.
The view defended here is that a work to be considered as a philosophical work on a specific subject like quantum field theory, it is necessary that it attains the right balance between broad philosophical aspects, more specific issues related to philosophy of science, and a detailed (usually very technical) treatment of, in this case, quantum field theory. One example where the right balance is achieved is in the book Particle metaphysics (2007) by Brigitte Falkenburg. In this work Falkenburg defends a moderate form of realism based on a properties realism strongly dependent on the practical unity of physics (that she calls semantic unity) due to the operational and theoretical layered structure of physics. The operational aspect of physics unity results from physics defining methodology in terms of the construction of scales of physical quantities and associated measurement theories and practices. There is a theoretical aspect to this unity due to the theory-ladenness of experimental data.
From the quantum electrodynamical description of quantum phenomena associated to a metaphysical idea of particle, Falkenburg develops an anti anti-realist argumentation. This enables her to develop an operational concept of particle based on the measurement of defined dynamic properties. In this work Falkenburg calls the attention to the fact that it is not possible to separate what might be considered the empirical elements of the theory from metaphysical presuppositions. This is an important issue to which one will return in Section 5.3.
Philosophy of Physics and Physics
As we have seen there might be some overlap between the work of a physicist doing foundations of physics and of a philosopher doing philosophy of physics, and there is a good reason for that. Being highly specialized, as an autonomous field, philosophy of physics was born as a field for the specialist, and the ones that have the technical knowhow are in this case physicists, i.e. the majority of the members of the community of philosophers of physics have had formal academic formation in physics. This social aspect has consequences on the type of intellectual output of the members of the community. In simple terms we might have too much physics and too little philosophy.
Studies in Foundations Of Physics: Is Philosophy of Physics Autonomous in Regard to Physics?
Since there is a bias towards physics one faces the problem of a possible lack of autonomy of philosophy of physics in relation to physics. It is already a common
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situation to have both theoretical physicists and philosophers of physics in workshops and conferences dedicated to foundations of physics. One example of this can be seen in the book Conceptual foundations of quantum field theory (1999); here we find the contributions of the participants at a conference on foundations of quantum field theory. Looking at the list of contributors we see that twenty or so participants were from departments of physics or related, and around seven from departments of philosophy. So, is philosophy of physics autonomous in regard to physics?
One should avoid generalizations; however there is a clear overlap between physics and philosophy of physics. In the next section it will be explored the positive possibilities opened by this. Right now it is sufficient to mention that this overlap does not have to create an identity problem to philosophy of physics if, besides the common-ground of issues of physics, philosophy of physics addresses clearly specific 'philosophical' issues that go beyond conceptual and foundational issues. Regarding this last point the view defended here is that it is not enough to have a few metaphysical-like standard academic issues around to justify philosophy of physics as an autonomous and creative discipline. There must be more. This point will be considered again when addressing the question of the contemporary relation of philosophy of physics with philosophy of science and with philosophy in general.
Philosophy of Physics as Continuation of Physics by Other Means
In Inventing Temperature: measurement and scientific progress (2004) Hasok Chang advocates the view of philosophy of physics (and also history of physics) has having a possible complementary function in relation to physics. According to Chang, philosophy of physics addresses foundational questions and explores possible alternative conceptual elements of physical theories. The importance of this philosophy of physics 'mode of inquire' is that it enables literally the creation of knowledge. As it was already mentioned, this particular aspect of philosophy of physics is also found in foundational and conceptual studies made from within physics itself. It is this overlapping of domains that enables this productive facet of philosophy of physics. In this way, with Chang, one can consider that philosophy of physics can be a continuation of physics by other means, but only because even if starting from a different point there is a locus of encounter between physics and philosophy of physics. This implies that the type of knowledge that can be provided by philosophy of physics is limited in a way that physics is not, which is not something we would not expect. Philosophy of physics in its physics-like mode is centered in particular in the conceptual elements of physical theories, or in some rare cases on the mathematical formulation of existing theories. This clearly limits the new knowledge that philosophy of physics can provide. However the contribution can potentially be quite important. Returning to Jacques MerleauPonty's 'philosophy of physics', he presents the case of Einstein's 1905 theory of relativity as a clear example where the change occurs manly in the conceptual element. In fact the mathematical structure of Einstein's theory of relativity was basically all in Lorentz's electron theory (the main contributions being made by Lorentz and Poincaré; see, e.g., Darrigol 2005 ). Einstein's contribution was at a conceptual level; he created a new conceptual system that transformed the experimental and mathematical elements of Lorentz's electron theory into what we now know as the theory of relativity. Even if one considers that a humanistic approach is not necessary in physics education, it can still be made a case for the need of philosophy (and history) of physics at a very pragmatic level: philosophy of physics (like history of physics) is very useful for the students learning and understanding of physics. In this review it will be considered one 'case-study', that of the learning of Einstein's theory of gravity.
To study Einstein's theory of gravity one needs first to learn advanced mathematics. This can be done in separate from physics education or in many cases as an all-in-one discipline where the students are taught on the run the differential geometry needed to cope with Einstein's theory of gravity. In the end it is unavoidable that a large amount of time is devoted to the learning of mathematics. That the study of Einstein's theory of gravity is inevitably loaded with mathematics can easily be seen in textbooks on the subject. As an example let us consider a few textbooks that we may consider as belonging to an introductory or intermediate level: 
